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Levels of Generality and the Protection of LBGT Rights Before the United
Nations General Assembly
Abstract
Various countries around the world have been according greater protection to the rights of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in recent years. At the same time, in other countries, the rights of
LGBT people are becoming more threatened.
Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly has never issued a
resolution specifically protecting or advancing the rights of LGBT people. This is remarkable given the
significant role the General Assembly has had in promulgating international human rights. From the
standpoint of advocates for LGBT rights, it would be desirable for the General Assembly to issue such a
resolution. This article suggests part of a strategy to be implemented in pursuing that goal. Attention is drawn
to the importance of levels of generality that are used to describe human rights. Several major United States
Supreme Court cases regarding constitutional rights illustrate this importance. Overall, the deployment of
higher levels of generality in discourse concerning LGBT rights can be more successful in securing results
favorable to those rights.
Although the General Assembly has not issued any resolutions protecting or advancing LGBT rights, other
international actors have. Certain international tribunals have issued decisions, certain international
organizations have issued resolutions and reports, and certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
issued principles and policies, all aimed at protecting or advancing LGBT rights. A recent and commendable
example is a resolution from the American Bar Association (ABA), adopted on August 11, 2014, that (among
other effects) condemns all laws that discriminate against LGBT people.
Upon review, it is observed that the language used in these actions reflects varying points on a spectrum,
running from a broad (or higher) level of generality to a specific (or lower) level of generality. Historically,
most General Assembly resolutions protecting or advancing human rights have adopted specific levels of
generality. An earlier effort to advance LGBT rights before the General Assembly, adopting only a moderately
specific level of generality, was unsuccessful.
This article asserts that, in designing the General Assembly’s first LGBT rights resolution, it will be safer and
more effective to follow the examples indicating higher levels of generality rather than those indicating lower
levels of generality. Given the record of the international authorities and precedents reviewed in this article,
and given the earlier unsuccessful attempt in the General Assembly, the first General Assembly resolution on
LGBT rights should adopt a very high level of generality.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Various countries around the world have been according 
greater protection to the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) people in recent years.1 At the same time, in 
other countries, the rights of LGBT people are becoming more 
threatened.2 
Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that the United 
Nations (U.N.) General Assembly has never issued a resolution 
specifically protecting or advancing the rights of LGBT people. 
This is remarkable given the significant role the General Assembly 
has had in promulgating international human rights.3 From the 
standpoint of advocates for LGBT rights, it would be desirable for 
the General Assembly to issue such a resolution. This article 
suggests part of a strategy to be implemented in pursuing that goal. 
Attention is drawn to the importance of levels of generality 
that are used to describe human rights. Several major United States 
Supreme Court cases regarding constitutional rights illustrate this 
importance.4 Overall, the deployment of higher levels of generality 
 
 1.  See generally Emine Saner, Gay Rights Around the World: The Best and Worst 
Countries for Equality, GUARDIAN, July 30, 2013, at 6, available at LEXIS. 
 2.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part III.B. 
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in discourse concerning LGBT rights can be more successful in 
securing results favorable to those rights. 
Although the General Assembly has not issued any resolutions 
protecting or advancing LGBT rights, other international actors 
have. Certain international tribunals have issued decisions, certain 
international organizations have issued resolutions and reports, 
and certain non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have issued 
principles and policies, all aimed at protecting or advancing LGBT 
rights.5 A recent and commendable example is a resolution from 
the American Bar Association (ABA), adopted on August 11, 2014, 
that (among other effects) condemns all laws that discriminate 
against LGBT people.6 
Upon review, it is observed that the language used in these 
actions reflects varying points on a spectrum, running from a broad 
(or higher) level of generality to a specific (or lower) level of 
generality. Historically, most General Assembly resolutions 
protecting or advancing human rights have adopted specific levels 
of generality.7 An earlier effort to advance LGBT rights before the 
General Assembly, adopting only a moderately specific level of 
generality, was unsuccessful.8 
This article asserts that, in designing the General Assembly’s 
first LGBT rights resolution, it will be safer and more effective to 
follow the examples indicating higher levels of generality rather 
than those indicating lower levels of generality. Given the record of 
the international authorities and precedents reviewed in this 
article, and given the earlier unsuccessful attempt in the General 
Assembly, the first General Assembly resolution on LGBT rights 
should adopt a very high level of generality. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
For an international human rights movement that desires to 
make progress, a General Assembly resolution or declaration 
 
 5.  See infra Part IV.B–G. 
 6.  See American Bar Association House of Delegates Adopts Resolutions on 
Cybersecurity, Domestic Violence, A.B.A. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014, 12:31 PM), http:// 
www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2014/08/american_bar 
_associa.html. 
 7.  See infra Part V.A. 
 8.  See infra Part V.D. 
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extolling the rights protected or advanced by the movement can be 
especially important. This special importance arises both from the 
position of the General Assembly in the U.N. and from the record 
of General Assembly resolutions in advancing human rights. 
A. The Position of the General Assembly in the United Nations 
The General Assembly is, of course, the only one of the six 
main bodies within the U.N. structure in which all member states of 
the U.N. are always represented.9 Accordingly, it has about 190 
voting members, representing almost every country in the world.10 
By comparison, the Security Council only has fifteen state members 
at any time,11 and the membership of the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) is limited to fifty-four state members.12 There 
are only fifteen permanent members of the International Court of 
Justice at any time,13 and the Secretariat, by its character, represents 
no countries per se.14 The operations of the sixth main body, the 
Trusteeship Council, were suspended in 1994.15 
Each member state has equal voting power in the General 
Assembly, with each state having one vote. This contrasts with the 
Security Council, in which five members are permanent and have a 
veto power over non-procedural decisions.16 Although each 
 
 9.  U.N. Charter art. 9, para. 1 (“The General Assembly shall consist of all 
the Members of the United Nations.”). 
 10.  See Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (setting 
forth a chart providing the names and dates of admission of the current U.N. 
member states). 
 11.  U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1 (“The Security Council shall consist of 
fifteen Members of the United Nations.”). 
 12.  Id. art. 61, para. 1 (“The Economic and Social Council shall consist of 
fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.”). 
 13.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3, para. 1, June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179 (“The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two 
of whom may be nationals of the same state.”). 
 14.  U.N. Charter art. 100, paras. 1–2 (providing that the Secretary-General 
and the Secretariat “shall not seek or receive instructions from any 
government . . . ” and that each U.N. member state “undertakes to respect the 
exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General 
and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities”).  
 15.  See Trusteeship Council, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en 
/mainbodies/trusteeship/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
 16.  U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1 (declaring, in its currently operative form, 
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ECOSOC member, at any time, also has equal voting power,17 this is 
less significant. First, as noted above, only a minority of U.N. 
member states sit on the ECOSOC at any time, so formal equality 
of voting strength does not provide equal representation of all 
members at any one time. Secondly, the role of the ECOSOC in 
current affairs is probably secondary in comparison to the activities 
of the General Assembly and Security Council.18 
Additionally, the scope of the General Assembly’s deliberations 
can be very broad. The U.N. Charter gives the General Assembly 
wide discretion in the matters it may discuss.19 The U.N. Charter 
also specifically authorizes the General Assembly to consider issues 
regarding the “maintenance of international peace and security,”20 
“promoting co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, 
educational and health fields,”21 “promoting international co-
operation in the political field . . . [and] the progressive 
development of international law.”22 As a practical matter, the 
range of subjects that the General Assembly can address, as long as 
there is some nexus to international affairs or international life, is 
nearly unlimited.23 
Other prominent institutions of international governance, 
however, often operate within more limited fields of activity. The 
U.N. framework provides for a very large number of specialized 
 
that China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States are permanent Security Council members); id. art. 27, para. 3 (providing 
that, on all non-procedural matters, no decision of the Security Council can be 
made without the concurring votes of the permanent members). 
 17.  Id. art. 67, para. 1 (“Each member of the Economic and Social Council 
shall have one vote.”). 
 18.  Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., United Nations Economic and Social Council, in 4 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1092, 1092 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) 
(“ECOSOC has never satisfied the hopes of those at the San Francisco Conference 
who saw it as the primary policy-making body for international economic and 
social cooperation.”). 
 19.  U.N. Charter art. 10 (“The General Assembly may discuss any questions 
or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers 
and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter . . . .”). 
 20.  Id. art. 11. 
 21.  Id. art. 13, para. 1(b). 
 22.  Id. art. 13, para. 1(a). 
 23.  See, e.g., M.J. Peterson, General Assembly, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
THE UNITED NATIONS 97, 99 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007) (asserting 
that provisions of the U.N. Charter grant to the General Assembly “a potentially 
unlimited agenda”). 
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agencies,24 for example, which can be very influential. Among these 
are the World Trade Organization; the International Monetary 
Fund; the U.N. Children’s Fund; the U.N. Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization; and the World Health Organization.25 
As valuable as many of these and other institutions are, they each 
have narrowly defined fields of focus. 
The General Assembly is, thus, in the particular position of 
affording nearly every state in the world equal voting strength on a 
virtually limitless array of international issues.26 This position can be 
seen to accord to the General Assembly a kind of deliberative 
equality to essentially every country on earth,27 which in turn 
provides a degree of popular legitimacy that is unique.28 The 
General Assembly has, with justice, been called “the preeminent 
global deliberative body.”29 
It is true that the General Assembly does not generally have 
the power to require any states, as a matter of legal obligation, to 
behave in any particular manner.30 It is designed to serve as a 
deliberative body and not a legislative one.31 However, it is not 
 
 24.  The specialized agencies are provided for and referenced in Article 57 of 
the U.N. Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 57. 
 25.  MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (6th ed. 2008). 
 26.  See Peterson, supra note 23, at 98–99. 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  See id. at 98 (noting that many U.N. member states “regard the Assembly 
as a forum where the masses can rally to counterbalance the aristocracy” of the 
permanent members of the Security Council (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 29.  See id. at 103. 
 30.  See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 25, at 114–15 (“[R]esolutions of the Assembly 
are generally not legally binding and are merely recommendatory, putting forward 
opinions on various issues with varying degrees of majority support.”). The 
General Assembly does have the authority to bind states on governance issues 
related to the management of the U.N. For example, Article 19 of the U.N. 
Charter deprives any member state that is “in arrears in the payment of its 
financial contributions to the [U.N.] . . . [of its] vote in the General Assembly” if 
the amount of the arrears exceeds a specified quantity. U.N. Charter art. 19.  
 31.  See SHAW, supra note 25, at 3 (observing that “[i]nternational law has no 
legislature” and noting by contrast that the resolutions of the General Assembly 
are not legally binding); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Conclusion: The United 
Nations as International Law-Giver, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
432, 443 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (“The General Assembly may draft, 
approve, and recommend international instruments for multilateral agreement. 
That body can not, however, compel them as binding obligations upon member 
states.”). 
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necessary that resolutions be legally binding in order for them to 
have substantial effects in the political world. The political impact 
of the General Assembly’s actions can attract notice and exert 
effects even though the actions themselves do not have binding 
prescriptive power.32 Furthermore, the General Assembly’s actions 
can indeed influence the development of international law. They 
can be, and have been, useful in establishing rules of customary 
international law and general principles of law.33 
B. The Record of General Assembly Resolutions in Advancing Human 
Rights 
Resolutions of the General Assembly have been invaluable in 
advancing the cause of human rights. One of the most powerful 
documents in the modern history of international human rights is 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration),34 which the General Assembly promulgated in 1948. 
It has been termed “the parent document, the primary inspiration, 
for most rights instruments in the world today.”35 The Universal 
Declaration figures prominently in most major compendia of 
human rights instruments, usually appearing first, or nearly first, 
among the instruments included in such collections.36 It has been 
 
 32.  An example would be the worldwide publicity generated when the 
General Assembly admitted the Palestinian territories with nonmember observer 
state status into the U.N. E.g., Press Release, Gen. Assembly, General Assembly 
Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in 
United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012). The reaction to 
the General Assembly’s action was eminently newsworthy. E.g., Colum Lynch, 
United Nations Upgrades Palestine’s Status: The U.N. General Assembly Passed a 
Resolution Recognizing Palestine as a “Non-Member Observer State”, WASH. POST, Nov. 
29, 2012, at world/national-security, available at 2012 WLNR 25420323. 
 33.  E.g., SHAW, supra note 25, at 82–83 (stating that General Assembly 
resolutions can be means of determining the existence of a state practice necessary 
to establish a rule of customary international law and adding that the 
International Court of Justice has noted that “evidence of the existence of rules 
and principles may be found in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly” as 
well as the Security Council); see also Joyner, supra note 31, at 440 (referencing the 
“quasi-legislative” capability of the General Assembly to “influence the nature and 
substance of contemporary international law in a number of ways”). 
 34.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
GAOR, 3rd Sess., (Vol. 1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 35.  MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW xvi (2001). 
 36.  E.g., BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (Ian Brownlie & Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill eds., 5th ed. 2006) (appearing third); HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
 
2015] LGBT RIGHTS BEFORE UNITED NATIONS 87 
called the “cornerstone” of the U.N.’s protection of human rights37 
and has been mentioned in the same vein of significance as the 
British Bill of Rights of 1689, the U.S. Declaration of Independence 
of 1776, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen of 1789.38 
It was understood from the beginning that the Universal 
Declaration was not intended to be a binding instrument.39 Given 
its status as a General Assembly resolution, its nonbinding 
character was not inappropriate. However, in spite of its initially 
nonbinding character, some of its provisions have been considered 
to constitute general principles of law or represent elementary 
considerations of humanity.40 The Universal Declaration has 
influenced the constitutions of many countries, and its great 
renown has been said to raise the question of its status as customary 
international law.41 
The General Assembly’s role in protecting human rights 
during the early years of the U.N. did not end with promulgating 
the Universal Declaration. Indeed, the Universal Declaration was 
only one of several significant treaties that are often referenced to 
collectively as the “International Bill of Human Rights,” and the 
General Assembly was involved with the creation of the others as 
well. The other treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).42 Some authorities 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (Council of Europe ed., 3d ed. 2007) (appearing first); 
HUMAN RIGHTS SELECTED DOCUMENTS 31 (W.J.F.M. van der Wolf ed., 1994) 
(appearing first after the U.N. Charter); HUMAN RIGHTS: SIXTY MAJOR GLOBAL 
INSTRUMENTS 2 (Winston E. Langley ed., 1992) (appearing first); THE RAOUL 
WALLENBERG COMPILATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 27 (Göran Melander & 
Gudmundur Alfredsson eds., 1997) (appearing first under the heading of 
“Universal Instruments, General Part”). 
 37.  SHAW, supra note 25, at 278. 
 38.  GLENDON, supra note 35, at xvii. 
 39.  BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36 (“The Declaration is 
not a legally binding instrument as such . . . .”); cf. SHAW, supra note 25, at 280 
(“The intention had been that the Declaration would be followed immediately by 
a binding universal convention on human rights, but this process took 
considerably longer than anticipated.”). 
 40.  BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 36. 
 41.  GLENDON, supra note 35, at 237 (referencing incorporation into national 
legal systems); SHAW, supra note 25, at 279 (referencing national constitutions and 
customary international law). 
 42.  DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
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also specifically view the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR as 
being part of the International Bill of Human Rights.43 
The ICCPR44 and the ICESCR45 are omnibus treaties that cover 
a broad array of rights that governments are required to accord to 
their domestic populations. For example, the ICCPR provides that 
“[e]very human being has the inherent right to life,”46 that “[a]ll 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect,”47 that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion,”48 and that “[e]veryone shall 
have the right to freedom of association with others.”49 The ICESCR 
was promulgated with substantial support from the Cold War’s 
Soviet bloc, and was largely intended as a collectivist-oriented 
counterpart to the individual rights secured by the ICCPR.50 For 
example, Article 7(a) states that parties recognize the right of 
everyone to fair wages, a decent living for themselves and their 
families, and safe and healthy working conditions, among other 
aspirations.51 
The 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR establishes a 
mechanism through which individual persons can claim to be 
victims of violations by their domestic governments of rights set 
 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (2007). See generally Tom J. Farer, Introduction, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS xvi (Paul Williams ed., 1981); HUMAN 
RIGHTS: SIXTY MAJOR GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 36, at 1 (providing historical 
background on the documents making up the International Bill of Human 
Rights—the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the 1966 
Optional Protocol). 
 43.  The Farer compilation is an example of this. Farer, supra note 42; see also 
WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 42, at 25 (including the Optional Protocol at 
this juncture in their discussion, although not earlier). 
 44.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 45.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 46.  ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(1). 
 47.  Id. art. 10(1). 
 48.  Id. art. 18(1). 
 49.  Id. art. 22(1). 
 50.  See Farer, supra note 42, at xvi–xvii (stating that “two distinct groups 
warred ferociously” over the relative significance of economic and social rights and 
declaring that “[t]he United States and several other capitalist democracies led the 
opposition against a coalition of Communist and developing states”). 
 51.  ICESCR, supra note 45, art. 7(a)–(b). 
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forth in the ICCPR.52 These complaints, called “communications,” 
are presented to the Human Rights Committee (Committee) set up 
by the ICCPR, which then investigates the complaints and reports 
its conclusions to the subject state in each case.53 These reports are 
often made public, and some of them furnish bases for discussion 
later in this article.54 
The ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the 1966 Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR were drafted by the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights,55 which was created by the ECOSOC in 1946.56 The General 
Assembly promulgated each of them in the late 1960s,57 and all 
were then opened for signature and ratification by states. Each of 
them has been signed and ratified (or acceded to) by many states.58 
They are viewed as legally binding international treaties, unlike the 
Universal Declaration.59 
In addition to promulgating this International Bill of Rights, 
the General Assembly was instrumental in the advancement of two 
other treaties that have attained foundational status in the 
 
 52.  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 [hereinafter Optional 
Protocol to ICCPR]. 
 53.  Optional Protocol to ICCPR, Article 1, provides the basis for 
“communications” setting forth individual claims of violations. Articles 4 through 6 
describe the investigative activities of the Committee regarding the 
communications. Articles 28 through 45 of the ICCPR establish the Committee. 
ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 28–45.  
 54.  See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 55.  WEISSBRODT & DE LA VEGA, supra note 42, at 25. 
 56.  Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Norms and Machinery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
ON THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 23, at 447. The U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights was replaced by the currently operating U.N. Human Rights Council in 
2006. E.g., id. at 447–48. 
 57.  ICCPR, supra note 44, at 52; Optional Protocol to ICCPR, supra note 52, 
at 59; ICESCR, supra note 45. 
 58.  The electronic database for the U.N. Treaty Series indicates that there 
are currently 168 state parties to the ICCPR, 162 state parties to the ICESCR, and 
115 state parties to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. See Human Rights Index, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties 
.aspx?id=4 (last visted Dec. 2, 2014) (providing links to the ICCPR, ICESCR, and 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR). 
 59.  See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 138 (“[T]he Universal Declaration set forth 
the basic principles upon which subsequent conventions would be base[d]. At 
least some of the principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration have ripened 
into customary international law, binding on all states.”). 
 
90 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
international protection of human rights.60 These are the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD)61 and the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).62 Both 
of these treaties were also promulgated by the General Assembly63 
and then signed and ratified (or acceded to) by a large number of 
states.64 The prominence of both in the current firmament of 
international human rights law is additional testimony to the 
significance of the General Assembly in this field. 
The General Assembly has also issued additional declarations 
in the area of human rights that have not been promulgated as 
treaties for signature but have nevertheless attained great 
importance. These include the Declaration on the Protection of 
Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict;65 the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities;66 and the U.N. 
Millennium Declaration.67 
This article emphasizes the importance of the General 
Assembly in contradistinction to other international bodies 
involved with international human rights. For example, there are 
several regional international organizations that make 
contributions in the area. Most prominent among them is the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which sits in 
Strasbourg, France, and enforces the European Convention for the 
 
 60.  See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 184–85. 
 61.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969). 
 62.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1981). 
 63.  G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/180, at 194 (Dec. 18, 1979); G.A. Res. 2106 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 47 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
 64.  The electronic database for the U.N. Treaty Series indicates that there 
are currently 177 state parties to the CERD and 188 states parties to the CEDAW. 
See Human Rights Index, supra note 58 (providing links to the CERD and CEDAW).  
 65.  G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 66.  G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
 67.  G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000). 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.68 
Another notable example is the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, which sits in San Jose, Costa Rica, and enforces the 
American Convention on Human Rights.69 Other international 
groups and organizations (including NGOs) also play distinct roles. 
All of these other organizations and groups are significant in 
the international protection of human rights; however, the General 
Assembly has special prominence in the field. It promulgated all 
the treaties constituting the International Bill of Human Rights, as 
well as the CERD and the CEDAW. Since those events, it has also 
issued numerous declarations designed to advance the cause of 
human rights in various respects. For the rights of LGBT people to 
attain optimal protection in the international arena, there will 
need to be a General Assembly resolution or declaration 
promoting those rights. 
III. THE POWER OF LEVELS OF GENERALITY 
An issue that potentially arises when discussing human rights is 
the generality that one uses to describe the rights involved. 
Descriptions of asserted rights can be viewed as falling somewhere 
on a spectrum, running from high levels of generality (descriptions 
in very broad terms) to low levels of generality (descriptions in very 
specific terms). Which level of generality is chosen can have 
substantial effects on the fate of one’s arguments. If advocates for 
LGBT rights are going to successfully encourage the General 
Assembly to promulgate a resolution protecting LGBT rights, a 
core issue will be which level of generality the resolution will adopt. 
Constitutional jurisprudence in the United States contains 
ample background for this issue and is reviewed at this point to 
provide a basis for further discussion in this article. 
 
 68.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953) (as amended). The ECtHR currently operates substantially as 
provided in Protocol No. 11 to the Convention. Protocol No. 11 to the 
Convention, May 11, 1994, C.E.T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998). 
 69.  American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
144 (entered into force July 18, 1978). 
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A. Levels of Generality Describing Rights 
Levels of generality are best introduced through hypothetical 
scenarios. For example, if one is complaining about a law that 
restricts abortion, one could argue that the law restricts a woman’s 
right to have an abortion. Such an argument would adopt a specific 
level of generality because it refers specifically to the abortion 
procedure. On the other hand, one could argue that the law 
restricts a woman’s right to make choices about her own health or 
her own body. This argument would adopt a higher level of 
generality since the phrase regarding the woman’s health or body 
would have a much broader potential scope of applicability. The 
phrase could also apply to choices about disease prevention, 
elective surgery, or even personal health habits. 
A similar contrast is illustrated when considering a law that 
criminalizes same-sex sexual behavior. If one believes that such a 
law violates individual rights, one could argue that each person has 
a right to engage in same-sex sexual behavior if he or she wants to. 
This argument would adopt a specific level of generality, since it 
pertains specifically to same-sex sexual relations. On the other 
hand, one could argue that such a law violates a right of each 
person to decide for himself or herself what sort of personal 
relationships to have. This argument would adopt a higher level of 
generality since the phrase regarding personal relationships would 
have a much broader potential scope of applicability. The phrase 
could also refer to heterosexual romantic relationships, personal 
friendships of any configuration, or even to basic family 
relationships. 
Whenever one discusses a person’s right to do a particular 
thing, the issue of the level of generality arises because any 
particular action can be described with various levels of generality. 
Furthermore, descriptions of asserted rights can be placed at 
various points along a spectrum between a very high level of 
generality (a very broad description) and a very low level of 
generality (a very specific description). This may seem self-evident 
at first, but in fact it has been a significant factor in many important 
constitutional cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 
Indeed, for nearly twenty years, the governing United States 
Supreme Court precedents for the two above examples used 
opposite levels of generality to describe the rights involved and 
reached opposite results. In the 1973 case of Roe v. Wade, the Court 
used a high level of generality (a very broad level) to describe a 
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woman’s rights where abortion was concerned.70 The Court 
determined that a constitutional right to “privacy” protected such 
decisions, rather than a right to abortion per se, and struck down 
the state laws involved.71 
On the other hand, in the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick, the 
Court used a low level of generality (a very specific level) to 
describe the rights of adults where private consensual same-sex 
sexual relations were concerned.72 The Court determined that at 
stake was a constitutional interest in engaging in “homosexual 
sodomy,”73 rather than an interest in privacy, and so the Court 
sustained the state law there involved. The Bowers decision was 
overruled in 2003, in circumstances that will be discussed later.74 
During the seventeen years between the decision in Bowers and 
2003, however, these opposing descriptions were a very visible 
feature of U.S. constitutional law. 
B. United States Supreme Court Perspective on Levels of Generality 
The United States Supreme Court has directly confronted the 
issue of varying levels of generality in one of its more interesting 
modern cases. In the 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,75 the 
Justices on the Court engaged in a lively discussion about the role 
of levels of generality in defining constitutional rights. The 
discussion was inconclusive because there was no majority opinion. 
But the case is valuable for the open and direct manner in which 
the Justices addressed the issue. 
The case involved Michael, whose blood tests determined that 
he had a ninety-eight percent chance of being the natural father of 
 
 70.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 71.  Id. at 152–53 (“In a line of decisions . . . the Court has recognized that a 
right of personal privacy . . . does exist under the Constitution . . . . This right of 
privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.” (citations omitted)). 
 72.  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
The Lawrence Court noted that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it 
is not correct today. It . . . should be and now is overruled.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
578. 
 73.  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (“[R]espondent would have us announce . . . a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling 
to do.”). 
 74.  See infra Part III.C. 
 75.  491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
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an infant girl, Victoria.76 Michael and Carole, Victoria’s mother, 
had been conducting an adulterous love affair while Carole was 
married to another man, Gerald.77 At various points after Victoria’s 
birth, Michael held out Victoria as his daughter.78 Indeed, Carole 
and Michael at one point signed a stipulation that Michael was 
Victoria’s natural father.79 However, Carole later reconciled with 
Gerald and instructed her attorneys not to file the stipulation.80 
Michael filed a filiation action in California state court to 
establish his paternity.81 But, California law provided that a child 
born to a married woman living with her husband is presumed to 
be a child of the marriage.82 The United States Supreme Court 
discerned a twofold rationale for the law: (1) an aversion to 
declaring children “illegitimate,” thereby possibly “depriving them 
of rights of inheritance and succession,” and (2) an interest in 
promoting the “peace and tranquillity” of families.83 Gerald argued, 
and the trial court agreed, that the California law effectively 
defeated Michael’s claim.84 
Before the Court, Michael asserted that he had a 
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with 
Victoria.85 In their opinions, the various Justices disagreed on how 
to describe Michael’s asserted rights.86 Justice William Brennan, in 
his dissent, maintained that Michael’s interest was a “generalized” 
interest in “parenthood,”87 the same as any other father of any 
child.88 Justice Brennan accordingly adopted a high level of 
 
 76.  Id. at 114. The opinions in the case use only first names for all relevant 
parties. Id. 
 77.  Id. at 113. 
 78.  Id. at 114. 
 79.  Id. at 114–15. 
 80.  Id. at 115. 
 81.  Id. at 114. 
 82.  Id. at 113 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989)). 
 83.  Id. at 125 (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN 
AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND SERVANT § 225 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
3d ed. 1882)). 
 84.  Id. at 115. The trial court found what it considered sufficient evidence 
that Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the times of Victoria’s conception and 
birth. Id. 
 85.  Id. at 121. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 88.  Id. at 139–44.  
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generality in describing Michael’s asserted rights.89 The plurality 
opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, however, adopted a more 
specific level of generality, at one point characterizing Michael’s 
interest as that of “the natural father of a child conceived within, 
and born into, an extant marital union.”90 
The choice of which level of generality to use in describing 
Michael’s asserted rights was instrumental in determining the 
outcome of the two opinions. According to Justice Brennan’s 
dissent, Michael had a constitutionally protected fundamental right 
in his asserted relationship with Victoria because his asserted 
interest was in the very fundamental relationship of parenthood as 
a general matter.91 The dissent did not necessarily assert that 
Michael should have parental rights regarding Victoria, but only 
that the state was required to give him a hearing to try to secure his 
rights.92 Conversely, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, defining 
Michael’s asserted interest in much narrower terms, determined 
that he had no fundamental, constitutionally cognizable interest at 
stake.93 Accordingly, the Court decided that California need not 
give him the hearing he sought to establish his rights.94 
In U.S. constitutional law circles, the Michael H. plurality 
opinion is probably most famous for its much-discussed “footnote 
6.” The discussion in the footnote extends to over five hundred 
words, and two of the four Justices forming Justice Scalia’s plurality 
expressly did not join in the footnote.95 The precise character of 
the footnote 6 discussion is not especially germane to the point 
here. However, it is worth noting that in it, Justice Scalia 
 
 89.  Id. at 136–57. 
 90.  Id. at 127 (plurality opinion). 
 91.  See id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (extolling Michael’s “claim that he 
is Victoria’s father” as paramount over the state’s interest in denying him the 
opportunity to assert the claim). 
 92.  Id. at 156. 
 93.  Id. at 127 (plurality opinion) (“This is not the stuff of which fundamental 
rights . . . are made.”). 
 94.  Id. at 129–30 (characterizing the matter of a hearing as “a question of 
legislative policy and not constitutional law”). The judgment of the Court was 
against Michael because, in an opinion concurring in the judgment but not in 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, Justice Stevens determined that the California 
law had accorded Michael an adequate opportunity for claiming visitation rights 
apart from the question of parenthood. Id. at 133–34 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 95.  Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I concur in all but 
footnote 6 of Justice Scalia’s opinion.”). Justice Kennedy also joined with Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion. Id. 
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acknowledged the significance of the choice of the level of 
generality in describing constitutional rights.96 
C. A Prominent Illustration for the Importance of Levels of Generality 
The Bowers case discussed above, along with the Lawrence v. 
Texas case that overruled it, dramatically illustrate the decisive 
impact that the choice of levels of generality can have on the 
analysis and the ultimate results of a decision. 
As noted in Part III.A, in 1986 the United States Supreme 
Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick.97 The case involved an adult male 
who was charged by local police with the violation of a state statute 
that criminalized same-sex sexual relations, even when undertaken 
in private between consenting adults.98 The man who was charged, 
Michael Hardwick, asserted that his constitutional right to privacy 
protected him from the enforcement of the statute.99 By referring 
to his right to privacy—rather than, say, a right to engage 
specifically in same-sex sexual relations—he was describing his 
asserted rights with a high level of generality. By relying on this 
high degree of generality, Hardwick’s counsel no doubt wished to 
avoid using such labels as “homosexuality” and, indeed, the subject 
of sexual practices altogether. 
However, the majority insisted on dwelling on such labels and 
practices, describing Hardwick’s asserted interest specifically as a 
“claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of 
sodomy.”100 In so doing, the majority used a very low level of 
generality to describe the interest that Hardwick had at stake. 
Indeed, in a rhetorical feat much remarked upon, the majority 
used the phrase “homosexual sodomy” (or similar phrases 
denoting both the labels of “homosexual” and “sodomy”) at least 
 
 96.  Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion) (“Though the dissent has no basis for 
the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at 
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right 
can be identified.”). 
 97.  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 
see supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
 98.  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187–88 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (West 
1984)). 
 99.  Id. at 190–91 (referencing the respondent’s reliance on “a right of 
privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy” that “for all intents and purposes 
ha[s] decided this case”). 
 100.  Id. at 191. 
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fifteen times in the space of only nine pages in U.S. Reports,101 the 
official reporting volume in which United States Supreme Court 
decisions are published. 
By concentrating so intently on the phrase “homosexual 
sodomy,” the majority drove home a very specific description of the 
interests involved and thereby attempted to discredit the 
application of a higher level of generality. Insisting that this low 
level of generality was the most appropriate description, the Court 
paraphrased Hardwick’s argument and succinctly stated its 
response to it: “[R]espondent would have us announce . . . a 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are 
quite unwilling to do.”102 The Court accordingly noted the 
continued existence of sodomy laws in many states at that time and 
determined that there was no constitutional right to engage in such 
relations.103 
The majority decision in Bowers drew two dissenting opinions, 
both of which adopted higher levels of generality. The first two 
sentences in the dissenting opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun 
aptly demonstrate this stance. Justice Blackmun had in mind two 
earlier United States Supreme Court cases applying the right to 
privacy—one protecting the viewing of motion pictures in one’s 
own home (even if they were legally obscene)104 and the other 
protecting telephone conversations from unauthorized wiretapping 
(even if the conversations discussed illegal activity).105 Justice 
Blackmun began his dissenting opinion in Bowers as follows: 
This case is no more about a fundamental right to engage 
in homosexual sodomy, as the Court purports to declare, 
than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to 
watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a 
fundamental right to place interstate bets from a 
telephone booth. Rather, this case is about the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men, namely, the right to be let alone.106 
 
 101.  See id. at 188 (twice); id. at 189 (once); id. at 190 (four times); id. at 191 
(three times); id. at 192 (once); id. at 195 (twice); id. at 196 (twice). 
 102.  Id. at 191. 
 103.  Id. at 196 (“We . . . are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some twenty-
five States should be invalidated on this basis.”). 
 104.  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 105.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 106.  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
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In focusing on “the right to be let alone,”107 the Blackmun 
dissent adopts the higher level of generality eschewed by the Bowers 
majority. 
Seventeen years after the Bowers decision, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed itself on the subject of same-sex sexual 
relations. The case was Lawrence v. Texas.108 Once again, the facts 
involved the imposition of criminal charges in the enforcement of 
a state law that criminalized same-sex sexual relations, even 
between consenting adults in private.109 Once again, those subject 
to the charges imposed under the statute argued that their 
constitutional rights had been violated.110 Had the Court followed 
the then-binding precedent in Bowers, it would have adopted a low 
level of generality, determined that the petitioners were arguing for 
a “constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy,”111 
found no such constitutional right, and ruled against them. 
However, in Lawrence, the Court adopted a high level of 
generality. Rather than focus narrowly on “homosexual sodomy,” 
the majority viewed the interest involved more broadly as an 
interest in “liberty.”112 In beginning its discussion of the merits, the 
Court majority indicated the breadth that it would be employing in 
its description of the rights involved: “We conclude the case should 
be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as 
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their 
liberty under the . . . Constitution.”113 
The ensuing discussion by the Court repeatedly extols the 
value and the breadth of “liberty” as a constitutional right and 
interest. Indeed, in an apparent rhetorical response to the majority 
opinion in Bowers, the word “liberty” appears twenty-five times in 
the Lawrence majority opinion, in the space of seventeen pages in 
U.S. Reports.114 As part of its summation, the Court in Lawrence 
 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107.  Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 108.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 109.  Id. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003)). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. 
 112.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 113.  Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
 114.  See id. at 562 (three times); id. at 564 (three times); id. at 565 (twice); id. 
at 567 (four times); id. at 571 (once); id. at 572 (once); id. at 573 (once); id. at 574 
(twice); id. at 575 (once); id. at 577 (three times); id. at 578 (four times). 
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referenced the persons charged under the law there at issue and 
noted that “[t]heir right to liberty . . . gives them the full right to 
engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.”115 This focus on liberty clearly adopts a high level of 
generality; it is not stated in terms of same-sex sexual relations or 
even sexual relations in general.116 The generality of its terms 
extends beyond the realm of sex, even though sexual relations were 
the subject of the facts involved.117 
The Court majority in Lawrence explicitly overruled the 
majority decision in Bowers.118 In so doing, it reversed the 
determination in the earlier case that there was no constitutional 
protection for private consensual same-sex sexual behavior between 
adults.119 However, it also demonstrated the potential power of 
adopting higher levels of generality when addressing issues of 
constitutional rights. 
D. A Variant-Form Sense of Generality 
The following segments of this article refer to levels of 
generality in two distinct senses. The first embodies the sense of 
generality illustrated by the United States Supreme Court’s 
contrasting approaches in Bowers and Lawrence.120 In this respect, 
“levels of generality” refers to the description used for asserted 
rights: a low level of generality describes the asserted rights using 
the specific facts relevant to the asserted rights, while a high level of 
generality describes the asserted rights using the broad concepts 
that could be said to encompass many different types of specific 
facts. This sense of “levels of generality” could be called “descriptive 
 
 115.  Id. at 578. 
 116.  See generally id. at 562–78. Of the twenty-five times that the word “liberty” 
appears in the Lawrence majority opinion, a variant of the word “sex” (either the 
word itself or “homosexual,” ”heterosexual,” ”sexuality,” “sexual,” or the like) 
appears in the same sentence as the word “liberty” only three times. Id. at 567 
(fourth such usage of the word “liberty”); id. at 567 (eleventh such usage); id. at 
572 (fourteenth such usage). While some of the other usages refer to intimate 
behavior without using a variant of the word “sex,” the conscious decision to avoid 
a specific connection between liberty and sex is apparent. 
 117.  Id. at 562–78. 
 118.  Id. at 560–64 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided . . . . Bowers v. 
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). 
 119.  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986), overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 120.  See supra Part III.C. 
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generality,” since it concerns the ways in which rights or interests 
are described. 
However, there is another sense of “levels of generality” that 
does not relate to the characterization of the asserted rights 
involved. Rather, this sense of generality relates to the range of 
factual circumstances that a particular interpretation of a rule is 
likely to affect. If a court or decision maker issues an opinion that is 
likely to affect a broad range of factual situations, it could be said 
that the decision is issued at a high level of generality.121 If the 
decision maker issues an opinion that will only address a narrow 
range of circumstances, it could be said that the decision is issued 
at a low level of generality.122 This sense of generality could be 
called “decisional generality,” since it tends to materialize when 
courts or other tribunals make decisions that could have varying 
degrees of applicability. 
In Part IV of this article, the various actions by the 
international actors addressed focus on both kinds of generality.123 
Often a low level of descriptive generality is favored by those who 
also employ a low level of decisional generality in making decisions. 
This article treats the two concepts as being analogous, even 
though they could be viewed as being technically distinct. The 
preference underlying this article in favor of a high level of 
generality applies in both senses of the term. 
IV. LEVELS OF GENERALITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ADVANCEMENT 
OF LGBT RIGHTS 
In recent decades, the international path of LGBT rights has 
experienced slow, albeit inconsistent, progress. Anti-LGBT 
governmental action in some states has been partially offset by 
 
 121.  For an example of the implications of high levels of generality, both in 
the descriptive and decisional senses, see the discussion of the Lawrence v. Texas 
decision in supra Part III.C. The Court in Lawrence described “liberty” in very broad 
terms and issued an opinion that it intended to affect a broad range of factual 
situations. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 122.  For an example of the implications of low levels of generality, both in the 
descriptive and decisional senses, see the discussion of the Bowers v. Hardwick 
decision in supra Part III.C. The Court in Bowers described the interest involved in 
very specific terms and seemed to believe the opinion would affect only what it 
considered to be an unworthy minority—those who engaged in homosexual 
sodomy. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 123.  See infra Part IV. 
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positive developments in international tribunals, the projects of 
some NGOs, and some U.N. bodies. These affirmative results have 
been framed at varying levels of generality. 
A. Key Recent Developments 
Recently, several countries around the world have supported 
or instituted anti-LGBT legislation. In June 2013, the Russian 
Duma passed a law banning the distribution of “propaganda” to 
minors regarding nontraditional sexual relationships.124 In 
December 2013, the Indian Supreme Court determined that the 
previously existing prohibition of sodomy was indeed constitutional 
under Indian law.125 In early 2014, Nigeria passed a “Same-Sex 
Marriage Prohibition Bill,” which imposed prison sentences for 
people who enter into same-sex unions, or aid such practices, or 
who assist LGBT NGOs.126 In February 2014, the Ugandan 
parliament passed an Anti-Homosexuality Act that increased 
punishments for same-sex sexual relations, in some cases including 
life imprisonment.127 Although the Ugandan constitutional court 
invalidated the Act in August 2014, observers maintain that the 
situation in Uganda for LGBT individuals still subjects them to 
“ongoing discrimination, arrest, and prosecution.”128 
On the other hand, in recent years, international tribunals, 
multilateral international organizations, and NGOs have taken 
steps that have advanced the cause of LGBT rights, albeit perhaps 
slowly.129 A review of the more significant of these actions is in 
 
 124.  Amendments to the Law Protecting Children from Information Harmful to Their 
Health and Development, PRESIDENT RUSS. (June 30, 2013, 12:40 PM), 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5660. See also, e.g., The Facts on LGBT Rights in Russia, 
COUNCIL FOR GLOBAL EQUAL., http://www.globalequality.org/newsroom/latest       
-news/1-in-the-news/186-the-facts-on-lgbt-rights-in-russia (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).  
 125.  See, e.g., Harmeet Shah Singh, India’s Supreme Court Declares Homosexual Sex 
Illegal, CNN (Dec. 11, 2013, 1:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/11/world 
/asia/india-same-sex-relationship/.  
 126.  See, e.g., LGBTI Rights—Still Not There Yet, IRIN (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=100487.  
 127.  See, e.g., Briefing: What Next for Uganda’s Anti-Gay Law?, IRIN (Aug. 14, 
2014), http://www.irinnews.org/report/100490/briefing-what-next-for-uganda-s   
-anti-gay-law; Elias Biryabarema, Uganda Plans Tougher Gay Sex Law Targeting Foreign 
NGOs, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2014/04/28/uganda-gay-sex-law-ngos_n_5226932.html.  
 128.  See Briefing: What Next for Uganda’s Anti-Gay Law?, supra note 127. 
 129.  See infra Part IV.B–H. 
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order to consider levels of generality used to frame the issues in 
each context. 
B. The Yogyakarta Principles 
The Yogyakarta Principles are among the most prominent 
efforts by NGOs to advance the legal rights of LGBT people 
internationally.130 The International Commission of Jurists131 and 
the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)132 undertook 
the task of developing “a set of international legal principles on the 
application of international law to human rights violations based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity.”133 A group of human 
rights experts drafted and adopted the principles on behalf of the 
two organizations at a conference in the Indonesian city of 
Yogyakarta in November 2006.134 
The principles generally take the form of twenty-nine 
numbered and specifically denominated rights. For example, 
Principle 4 is “[t]he Right to Life,” Principle 5 is “[t]he Right to 
Security of the Person,” Principle 8 is “[t]he Right to Education,” 
and Principle 24 is “[t]he Right to Found a Family.”135 
The principles bearing the lowest numbers in this list tend to 
be stated in broader terms than the principles bearing higher 
numbers in the list. For example, Principle 1 is “[t]he Right to the 
 
 130.  THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
GENDER IDENTITY (2007), available at http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org 
/principles_en.pdf [hereinafter THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES].  
 131.  According to its website, the International Commission of Jurists is 
“[c]omposed of [sixty] eminent judges and lawyers from all regions of the world,” 
and it “promotes and protects human rights through the Rule of Law, by using its 
unique legal expertise to develop and strengthen national and international 
justice systems.” About, INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS, http://www.icj.org/about/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2014). The website also states that it was established in 1952, has its 
offices in Geneva, and is active on five continents. Id. 
 132.  The website of the ISHR states that it was “established in 1984 to support 
human rights defenders and advocate for stronger and more effective human 
rights laws and institutions.” History and Impact, INT’L SERVICE FOR HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ishr.ch/history-and-impact (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). It lists offices in 
Geneva and New York City. Id. 
 133.  THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 130, at 7. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 5. 
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Universal Enjoyment of Human Rights,” and Principle 3 is “[t]he 
Right to Recognition before the Law.”136 
However, the effect of the twenty-nine principles presented as 
a whole is the assertion of a formidable set of rights, stated with 
remarkable specificity. This particularity and specificity is 
magnified by the manner of their presentation throughout the 
thirty-five-page booklet in which they were electronically 
published.137 Each of the twenty-nine principles is followed by a 
detailed description of the rights covered by the principle,138 and 
the discussion then continues with a set of specific state actions that 
are required in order to implement each principle.139 There are 
generally four to six such specific state actions dictated for every 
principle. 
For example, the entry for Principle 20, “The Right to 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association,” reads in its 
entirety as follows: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association, including for the purposes of peaceful 
demonstrations, regardless of sexual orientation or 
gender identity. Persons may form and have recognised, 
without discrimination, associations based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity, and associations that 
distribute information to or about, facilitate 
communication among, or advocate for the rights of, 
persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender 
identities. 
States shall: 
(a) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other 
measures to ensure the rights to peacefully organise, 
associate, assemble and advocate around issues of 
sexual orientation and gender identity, and to obtain 
legal recognition for such associations and groups, 
without discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity; 
(b) Ensure in particular that notions of public order, 
public morality, public health and public security are 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See id. 
 138.  See id. at 10–31. 
 139.  See id. 
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not employed to restrict any exercise of the rights to 
peaceful assembly and association solely on the basis 
that it affirms diverse sexual orientations or gender 
identities; 
(c) Under no circumstances impede the exercise of the 
rights to peaceful assembly and association on 
grounds relating to sexual orientation or gender 
identity, and ensure that adequate police and other 
physical protection against violence or harassment is 
afforded to persons exercising these rights; 
(d) Provide training and awareness-raising programmes to 
law enforcement authorities and other relevant 
officials to enable them to provide such protection; 
(e) Ensure that information disclosure rules for voluntary 
associations and groups do not, in practice, have 
discriminatory effects for such associations and groups 
addressing issues of sexual orientation or gender 
identity, or for their members.140 
This degree of specificity seems justified as a policy matter in view 
of the magnitude of societal and legal hostility that can be leveled 
at people around the world on the basis of their sexual orientation 
or gender identity. This article is not asserting that the specificity of 
the Yogyakarta Principles (or any other document or instrument) is 
a bad idea. The point, for the moment, is simply to note that the 
Yogyakarta Principles were drafted with a high degree of specificity 
(that is to say, a very low level of generality). 
C. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) has been one of the more prominent U.N. agencies to 
explicitly address LGBT rights. For the moment, two especially 
influential reports by the OHCHR stand out as its most noteworthy 
contributions in this effort. The first of these is its November 17, 
2011, report to the U.N. Human Rights Council (HR Council), 
prepared at the HR Council’s request earlier the same year. It is 
titled: Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against 
Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.141 
 
 140.  Id. at 25. 
 141.  U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights & U.N. Secretary-General, 
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The HR Council has stated its appreciation for this report, and has 
requested that it be updated.142 The second is its 2012 publication 
for external distribution: Born Free and Equal: Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law.143 Both can be said 
to have adopted conspicuously specific levels of generality. 
1. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, November 
17, 2011, Report to the United Nations Human Rights Council 
As noted above, the OHCHR prepared this report at the 
request of the HR Council. The HR Council’s methodology here is 
evident: the report was intended as a preliminary step for action. It 
was anticipated that the OHCHR would investigate, review, and 
describe in detail the myriad of ways in which governmental and 
private actors around the world discriminate against and oppress 
LGBT people. With such a report in hand, there would be an 
especially coherent foundation upon which to urge corrective 
action by governments and international organizations. The report 
would furnish a documented basis for addressing abuses against 
persons on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Accordingly, the report is detailed, twenty-five pages in length, 
and preceded by a thematic table of contents.144 As befits such a 
report, it catalogs a detailed list of the types of discriminatory 
practices against LGBT people (such as in employment, health 
care, education, freedom of expression, and so on).145 It also 
focuses on violence against LGBT people and discriminatory laws 
against them.146 Since this document was framed and mandated as a 
report, this structure is appropriate. 
At the end of the report, the last section sets forth a set of 
eight highly specific recommendations. Each recommendation 
 
Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on Their 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter Discriminatory Laws]. 
 142.  Human Rights Council Res., Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity, 27th Sess., Sept. 8–26, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/L.27/Rev. 1 
(Sept. 24, 2014). 
 143.  U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Born Free and Equal: Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/12/06 (Sept. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Born Free and Equal]. 
 144.  See Discriminatory Laws, supra note 141, at 2. 
 145.  See id. 
 146.  See id. 
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suggests that member states enact specifically described legislative 
measures or take other prescriptive action.147 Although all of these 
recommendations are laudable and well-supported by the body of 
the report, they are stated with a high degree of specificity. That is, 
they are stated at a very low level of generality. 
2. Born Free and Equal 
This publication takes the form of a sixty-two page, folio-style 
booklet prepared by the OHCHR, which has as its declared 
purpose, “[T]o set out the core obligations that States have towards 
LGBT persons.”148 The booklet is then organized according to five 
steps that are enumerated and described as “five core legal 
obligations of States” for protecting LGBT persons.149 These are to 
(1) Protect individuals from homophobic and 
transphobic violence; 
(2) Prevent torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment of LGBT persons; 
(3) Decriminalize homosexuality; 
(4) Prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity; and 
(5) Respect freedom of expression, association and 
peaceful assembly.150 
After the broad statement of each step, the booklet provides a 
detailed discussion of specific actions states should take to 
implement the steps. For example, under the first step, “Protect 
Individuals from Homophobic and Transphobic Violence,” the 
booklet asserts that “[s]tates have obligations under international 
law to prevent extrajudicial executions, investigate such killings as 
occur and bring those responsible to justice.”151 
Also, as part of that step, the booklet asserts, “States have an 
obligation to enact . . . hate crime laws that address homophobic 
and transphobic violence.”152 As well, the discussion of this step 
provides that “[s]tates also have a duty to provide safe refuge to 
 
 147.  Id. paras. 84(a)–(h). 
 148.  Born Free and Equal, supra note 143, at 10. 
 149.  Id. at 5. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 15. 
 152.  Id. at 19. 
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individuals fleeing persecution on grounds of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity.”153 
Each of these individual prescriptions is specific in character, 
and each of the five steps contains numerous such prescriptions. 
All of the prescriptions are well-considered, thorough, and 
unquestionably well-founded. The booklet as a whole operates at a 
very high level of specificity, which is to say at a low level of 
generality. 
D. European Court of Human Rights 
Political leaders established the Council of Europe in 1949 as 
part of the aftermath of World War II.154 One of the primary goals 
for the Council of Europe was to facilitate “a closer unity between 
all like-minded countries of Europe.”155 To that end, a year later the 
Council of Europe member states entered into the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms,156 sometimes called the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). Section II of the ECHR, in its present 
form, establishes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
which is charged to “ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken” by the states party to the ECHR.157 
The ECtHR has issued a number of rulings significantly 
protective of LGBT rights. Most of them relate to Article 8(1) of 
the ECHR, which provides, “Everyone has the right to respect for 
 
 153.  Id. at 20. 
 154.  E.g., DAVID MCKAY, RUSH TO UNION: UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN 
FEDERAL BARGAIN 39 (1996) (noting that among “the tentative moves towards 
European cooperation in the immediate post-war years, [the first was] the creation 
of the Council of Europe in 1949”). 
 155.  Statute of the Council of Europe, pmbl., para. 4, May 5, 1949, 87 
U.N.T.S. 103 (as amended). It should be noted that the Council of Europe is 
entirely separate from the European Union and all of its institutions. E.g., T.C. 
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 21 (7th ed. 2010) (“EU 
terminology can be confusing. The ‘European Council,’ the ‘Council,’ and the 
‘Council of Europe’ are three quite different things. The first two are European 
Union institutions. The latter is not even part of the EU, but is an entirely separate 
European organization . . . .”). 
 156.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended) 
[hereinafter European Convention]. 
 157.  Id. art. 19. 
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his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”158 
Nothing in the ECHR specifically mentions the rights of gay men, 
lesbians, bisexuals, transgender persons, homosexuals, or (for that 
matter) heterosexuals. However, the ECtHR has consistently 
interpreted this provision to provide a substantial measure of 
protection to LGBT people who have been disadvantaged by 
national legislation. The first of the ECtHR precedents in this area 
was Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, from 1981.159 The case involved a 
shipping clerk in Belfast, Northern Ireland, Jeffrey Dudgeon, 
whom the reported facts described as “a homosexual.”160 The police 
went to his address to execute a warrant regarding the misuse of 
drugs.161 They seized a quantity of cannabis, which led to another 
person being charged on drug offenses.162 Some of Dudgeon’s 
personal papers mentioning same-sex sexual activities were seized, 
and he was asked to go to a police station, where he was questioned 
for about four and a half hours concerning his sexual life.163 At the 
time of his questioning, the criminal law applicable to Northern 
Ireland penalized “buggery” and “gross indecency” between 
males.164 Ultimately, criminal proceedings were never instituted, 
and his papers, with annotations on them, were returned to him.165 
The ECtHR determined that the case concerned “a most 
intimate aspect of private life” and that “there must exist 
particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of the 
public authorities can be legitimate.”166 Finding the reasons given 
by the U.K. government to be insufficient,167 the ECtHR held that 
there was a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.168 
In terms of levels of generality, the ECtHR chose to view 
Dudgeon’s rights using a high level of generality (a very broad 
description). It described his interest as being in his private life.169 
This was in line with the United States Supreme Court’s later 
 
 158.  Id. art. 8. 
 159.  App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981). 
 160.  Id. at 149. 
 161.  Id. at 158. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 151. 
 165.  Id. at 158. 
 166.  Id. at 165. 
 167.  Id. at 167–68. 
 168.  Id. at 168. 
 169.  Id. at 165. 
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decision in Lawrence v. Texas, discussed earlier in this article,170 and 
indeed the Supreme Court cited the Dudgeon case in its Lawrence 
opinion.171 On the other hand, the ECtHR could have chosen a 
lower level of generality (a very specific description) and described 
his interest as, for example, being that of a homosexual man to 
engage in sodomy. This reasoning would be in line with the 
approach of the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, as noted earlier in this article.172 
There were six dissenting judges in the Dudgeon case, and their 
arguments illustrate that some judges on the ECtHR would have 
found it preferable to apply lower levels of generality. Dissenting 
Judge Zekia emphasized Christian and Moslem religious beliefs 
against homosexuality and stated that “[a]ll civilized countries until 
recent years penalized sodomy and buggery and akin unnatural 
practices.”173 This approach would have addressed Dudgeon’s 
specific circumstances rather than his general interest in privacy. 
Similarly, the dissenting opinion of Judge Matscher asserted 
that, for some time prior to the case, there had been “no criminal 
prosecutions in circumstances corresponding to the present case”174 
in Northern Ireland—Dudgeon himself had not been 
prosecuted.175 Judge Matscher’s view preferred a closer review of 
the specific facts and their likely impact on Dudgeon rather than 
the majority’s general views regarding privacy.176 Judge Matscher’s 
perspective, preferring an emphasis on the lack of criminal 
prosecutions against Dudgeon and others, reflected a low degree of 
decisional generality. 
A similar result was obtained seven years later in Norris v. 
Ireland.177 This case involved David Norris, whom the reported facts 
described, among other things, as “an active homosexual [who] has 
 
 170.  See supra notes 108–119 and accompanying text. 
 171.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (citing Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 149). 
 172.  See supra notes 97–107 and accompanying text. 
 173.  Dudgeon, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 171 (Zekia, J., dissenting). 
 174.  Id. at 175 (Matscher, J., dissenting). 
 175.  Id. at 159 (majority opinion) (“The police investigation file was sent to 
the Director of Prosecutions. It was considered with a view to instituting 
proceedings for the offense of gross indecency between males. The Director . . . 
decided that it would not be in the public interest for proceedings to be 
brought . . . .”). 
 176.  See id. at 175 (Matscher, J., dissenting). 
 177.  App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988). 
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been a campaigner for homosexual rights in Ireland since 1971.”178 
The criminal laws in Ireland at the time also prohibited “buggery” 
and “gross indecency” between men.179 Unlike the situation in 
Dudgeon, there was never any police enforcement action against 
Norris.180 Instead, the case arose because Norris brought an action 
attacking the Irish criminal prohibitions.181 He alleged that he had 
suffered “deep depression” on realizing that “any overt expression 
of his sexuality would expose him to criminal prosecution,” that a 
psychiatrist had advised him that “if he wished to avoid anxiety 
attacks . . . he should leave Ireland,” and that he had suffered 
“verbal abuse and threats of violence” as a result of his public 
activities to advance LGBT rights.182 
The ECtHR sided entirely with Norris. It agreed that “the very 
existence of this legislation continuously and directly affects his 
private life” and that “the impugned legislation interferes with 
Norris’s right to respect for his private life under Article 8(1).”183 
Once again, the ECtHR interpreted Article 8(1) of the ECHR using 
a high level of generality. Once again as well, six judges on the 
ECtHR dissented. The dissenters emphasized that Norris “was not 
subjected to any action, penalty, or other measure by his country’s 
authorities in respect of any homosexual acts committed by him” 
and maintained that “[t]he various minor difficulties of which the 
applicant complains were not caused by the authorities.”184 Their 
approach would have attached more importance to the specific 
circumstances of the case, and accordingly, indicated application of 
a lower level of decisional generality. 
Later cases before the ECtHR follow the same patterns. In the 
1992 case of B. v. France,185 the court determined that because the 
French government had not made birth certificate changes or 
undertaken other actions requested by the transsexual applicant, 
she “finds herself daily in a situation which, taken as a whole, is not 
 
 178.  Id. at 187. 
 179.  Id. at 189–90. 
 180.  See id. at 189 (“It is common ground that at no time before or since the 
court proceedings brought by the applicant has he been charged with any offence 
in relation to his admitted homosexual activities.”). 
 181.  Id. at 187–88. 
 182.  Id. paras. 10(i), (ii), (iv), (v). 
 183.  Id. at 197. 
 184.  Id. at 203 (Valticos, J., dissenting). Judge Valticos’s dissent was approved 
by Judges Gölcüklü, Matscher, Walsh, Bernhardt, and Carrillo Salcedo. 
 185.  App. No. 13343/87, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1992). 
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compatible with the respect due to her private life.”186 Accordingly, 
the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 
of the ECHR.187 As in earlier cases, six judges dissented.188 One of 
the dissenting judges maintained, “The Convention does not 
guarantee the right to change sex, nor the right to amendment of 
civil status documents.”189 This assertion illustrates the preference 
of at least one judge on the ECtHR for a lower level of generality, as 
opposed to the higher level preferred by the majority. 
The following year the ECtHR reached a similar result when it 
addressed provisions of the Cyprus Criminal Code prohibiting 
“carnal knowledge . . . against the order of nature.”190 The case 
involved a Cypriot man, whom the court described as “a 
homosexual who . . . states that he suffers great strain, 
apprehension and fear of prosecution by reason of the legal 
provisions which criminalise certain homosexual acts.”191 The 
ECtHR determined that “the existence of the prohibition 
continuously and directly affects the applicant’s private life”192 and 
concluded that there had been a breach of Article 8 of the 
ECHR.193 
 
 186.  Id. at 33–34, para. 63; see also id. at 4, paras. 13–14 (detailing the 
unresponsiveness of the French authorities to the earlier requests of the 
applicant). 
 187.  Id. at 35, para. 3. 
 188.  See id. at 25. 
 189.  Id. at 37, para. 3 (Pinheiro Farinha, J., dissenting). 
 190.  See Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 486, para. 8 
(1993) (citing CYPRUS CRIMINAL CODE § 171(a)). 
 191.  Id. para. 7. 
 192.  Id. at 494, para. 24. 
 193.  Id. at 495, para. 1; cf. Laskey, Jaggard, & Brown v. United Kingdom, App. 
Nos. 21627/93, 21628/93 & 21974/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (1997). This case 
involved the prosecution on charges of assault and wounding of several men who 
had engaged in, filmed, and distributed the ensuing films of consensual 
sadomasochistic behavior. Id. at 42, paras. 7–8. The ECtHR concluded that there 
had been no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. Id. at 52. But, the ECtHR 
conceded that “the criminal proceedings against the applicants which resulted in 
their conviction constituted an ‘interference by a public authority’ with the 
applicants’ right to respect for their private life.” Id. at 56, para. 35 (quoting 
European Convention, supra note 156, art. 8). The court sustained the 
government’s action because it viewed the interference as the type of interference 
“necessary in a democratic society,” as allowed by Article 8(2) of the ECHR. Id. at 
60, para. 50. 
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The decisions of the ECtHR majorities indicate a consistent 
preference for high levels of generality and evince a largely 
consistent pattern of favorable results for LGBT people. The 
dissenters consistently prefer lower levels of generality and reach 
results less favorable to LGBT people. 
E. The Human Rights Committee 
An earlier segment of this article introduced the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).194 It was noted that 
the ICCPR forms part of the International Bill of Human Rights,195 
and that the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR established a 
mechanism through which individual persons can claim to be 
victims of violations by their domestic governments of rights set 
forth in the ICCPR.196 The written claims in such cases are called 
“communications,” and they are submitted to the Committee 
established by the ICCPR.197 The Committee often publishes 
opinions resolving the claims brought in this manner.198 
Several opinions of the Committee have addressed LGBT 
rights. Issues of LGBT rights have often arisen before the 
Committee on the basis of Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, which 
provides: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation.”199 
It can be seen that this language contains some phraseology 
that is similar to that in Article 8(1) of the ECHR.200 The ICCPR 
impels protection of one’s “privacy” and “family,”201 while the 
ECHR language references “respect for private and family life.”202 
 
 194.  See supra notes 42–59 and accompanying text. 
 195.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 196.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 197.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 198.  OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE FACT SHEET NO. 15 (REV. 1), at 
28 (2005) (“The . . . final decisions on individual complaints and other documents 
produced by and for the Committee are all available and searchable online in the 
Treaty Bodies database of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights . . . .”). 
 199.  ICCPR, supra note 44. 
 200.  Compare ICCPR, supra note 44, with European Convention, supra note 
156, art. 8(1). 
 201.  See ICCPR, supra note 44. 
 202.  European Convention, supra note 156, art. 8; see also supra Part IV.D. 
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The Committee, along lines similar to those followed by the 
ECtHR, has on occasion used the treaty reference to “privacy” as a 
means of protecting LGBT rights.203 The earliest significant 
decision by the Committee in the area is Toonen v. Australia, from 
1994.204 It involved Nicholas Toonen, whom the Committee 
described as “a leading member of the Tasmanian Gay Law Reform 
Group.”205 Toonen challenged two provisions of the Tasmanian 
Criminal Code, which “criminalize[d] various forms of sexual 
contact between men.”206 The two provisions had not been 
enforced in a decade,207 and accordingly, had never been directly 
enforced against Toonen. However, he argued that because of his 
long-term relationship with another man, and because of his very 
public activism, “his private life and his liberty [were] threatened by 
the continued existence” of the two criminal code provisions.208 
The Committee determined that the facts “reveal a violation” 
of Article 17(1) of the ICCPR.209 In reaching this determination, 
the Committee repeatedly emphasized the importance of the 
private character of what was being protected.210 For his part, 
Toonen repeatedly referenced his interest as based in privacy,211 
and even Australia itself conceded that he had been a victim of 
 
 203.  The primary Committee ruling linking LGBT rights to privacy appears to 
be Human Rights Comm., Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994), reprinted in Human Rights Comm., 
Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 
40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) [hereinafter Toonen]. Later Committee decisions 
appear to be based on nondiscrimination, as noted in the text infra notes 214–236.  
 204.  Toonen, supra note 203. 
 205.  Id. para. 1. 
 206.  Id. para. 2.1. 
 207.  Id. para. 8.2. 
 208.  Id. para. 2.3. 
 209.  Id. para. 9. 
 210.  E.g., id. para. 8.2 (noting that “it is undisputed that adult consensual 
sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of ‘privacy . . .’” in Article 17(1) 
of the ICCPR); id. para. 8.6 (“The Committee cannot accept that for the purposes 
of article 17 of the Covenant, moral issues are exclusively a matter of domestic 
concern, as this would open the door to withdrawing from the Committee’s 
scrutiny a potentially large number of statutes interfering with privacy.”). 
 211.  E.g., id. para. 2.2 (“The author [of the communication submitting the 
complaint to the Committee] observes that the [relevant] sections of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code empower Tasmanian police officers to investigate 
intimate aspects of his private life . . . .”); id. para. 3.1(a) (“The author affirms that 
[the relevant provisions] of the Tasmanian Criminal Code . . . result in a violation 
of the right to privacy . . . .”). 
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arbitrary interference with his privacy.212 Accordingly, all the parties 
involved in the Toonen case viewed the matters at interest with a 
high level of generality, focusing on “privacy.” Given that the 
criminal code provisions had never actually been enforced against 
Toonen, the Committee could have used a lower level of decisional 
generality, observing in the specific circumstances of this case that 
he suffered no substantial police actions against him. This had 
been one of the approaches of the dissenters in the Norris and 
Dudgeon cases before the ECtHR.213 However, the Committee 
maintained its notably high level of generality. 
A subsequent ruling by the Committee also supported the 
rights of LGBT people, but involved the principle of 
nondiscrimination rather than privacy per se. This was Young v. 
Australia, from 2003.214 The case involved an interesting feature of 
the Australian veteran benefits regime under the Australian 
Veteran’s Entitlement Act (VEA). The relevant VEA provisions 
allowed for pension benefits to be paid to a person who had been a 
dependent of a veteran, even if the dependent had not been 
married to the veteran, as long as the dependent and the veteran 
had been in an “opposite sex . . . marriage-like relationship” before 
the veteran’s death.215 However, the VEA did not provide for such 
payments to a dependent of a veteran in a same-sex relationship, 
even if it was in all other respects “marriage-like.”216 
This situation most directly involved the issue of discriminatory 
treatment. Accordingly, the provision of the ICCPR addressing 
societal discrimination was more at issue than Article 17(1), the 
privacy provision. The chief antidiscrimination provision in the 
ICCPR is Article 26, which reads: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the 
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
 
 212.  Id. para. 6.1 (“[T]he State party concedes that the author has been a 
victim of arbitrary interference with his privacy . . . .”). 
 213.  Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 202–04 
(1988) (Valticos, J., dissenting); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 
4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 171–88 (1981) (Matscher, J., dissenting). 
 214.  Human Rights Comm., Young v. Australia, Communication No. 
941/2000, July 14–Aug. 8, 2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Sept. 18, 
2003) [hereinafter Young]. 
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2015] LGBT RIGHTS BEFORE UNITED NATIONS 115 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.217 
The Committee determined that Australia had provided “no 
arguments on how this distinction between same-sex partners, who 
are excluded from pension benefits under law, and unmarried 
heterosexual partners, who are granted such benefits, is reasonable 
and objective.”218 Accordingly, the Committee determined that this 
discrimination violated Article 26 of the ICCPR.219 
While the Committee made this decision on the basis of 
discrimination rather than privacy, it is still fairly viewed as 
reflecting a choice on the Committee’s part to adopt a broad level 
of decisional generality. The individual opinion appended to the 
Committee’s decision by Committee members Ruth Wedgwood 
and Franco DePasquale220 provides a point of comparison. These 
Committee members stated that “Australia has not chosen to enter 
into any discussion, pro or con, on the merits of the claim made 
under Article 26 of the Covenant.”221 Accordingly, they viewed the 
Committee as having “essentially entered a default judgment”222 
and concluded that “[i]n every real sense, this is not a contested 
case.”223 
In that connection, Committee members Wedgwood and 
DePasquale observed, “[T]he Committee has not purported to 
canvas the full array of ‘reasonable and objective’ arguments that 
other states” might offer in the future to justify such differential 
treatment.224 They concluded that, in their view, “the Committee 
must continue to be mindful of the scope of what it has, and has 
not, decided in each case.”225 They accordingly seem to have left 
 
 217.  ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 26. 
 218.  Young, supra note 214, at 15, para. 10.4. 
 219.  Id. at 16, para. 11 (“The Human Rights Committee . . . is of the view that 
the facts as found by the Committee reveal a violation by Australia of article 26 of 
the Covenant.”). 
 220.  Id. at 17–19 app. ( Wedgwood & DePasquale, concurring). 
 221.  Id. at 18. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 19. 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id. 
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the door open for opposing results in cases where the specific facts 
are different, that is, in which a state party makes a spirited and 
determined argument in favor of differential treatment. The 
perspective of Committee members Wedgwood and DePasquale 
can be considered to focus more specifically on the facts of the 
Young case, and thus, adopt a lower level of decisional generality. 
On the other hand, the Committee’s decision, which does not 
emphasize the possibility of different results in later cases, can be 
viewed as adopting a broader perspective and higher level of 
decisional generality.226 
A more recent decision by the Committee found prohibited 
discrimination in circumstances very similar to those of the Young 
case. This was the case of X v. Colombia, from 2007.227 This case also 
concerned a government program that benefitted different-sex 
unmarried couples, but excluded same-sex unmarried couples 
from benefits.228 The only major difference was that the payments 
involved derived from a social welfare survivorship program rather 
than a veterans’ survivorship program.229 
The Committee determined that Colombia had “put forward 
no argument that might demonstrate that such a distinction 
between same-sex partners . . . and unmarried heterosexual 
partners . . . is reasonable and objective.”230 The Committee found 
that Colombia had violated Article 26 of the ICCPR.231 In doing so, 
the Committee specifically recalled its earlier decision in Young 
addressing such similar facts and declared again that “[A]rticle 26 
 
 226.  Another indication of the broad scope of generality adopted by the 
Committee is its determination in the Toonen case that discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. Toonen, supra 
note 204, para. 8.7. The Committee re-emphasized this position in its Young 
decision. Young, supra note 214, at 15 n.20. 
 227.  Human Rights Comm., Views on Communication No. 1361/2005, March 
12–30, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 (May 14, 2007). 
 228.  Id. at 4, para. 2.3 (indicating that benefits were payable to “members of a 
de facto marital union,” without discrimination against them resulting from their 
not being married); id. para. 2.6 (indicating the governmental ombudsman’s 
position that “homosexuals were not allowed to exercise rights recognized to 
heterosexuals such as the right to marry or to apply for a pension transfer on a 
partner’s death”). 
 229.  Id. para. 2.1. The payments sought would have been from the Social 
Welfare Fund of the Colombian Congress and were in the nature of a pension 
transfer. Id. 
 230.  Id. at 10, para. 7.2. 
 231.  Id. 
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comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation.”232 
Accordingly, the broad level of generality implicit in the scope of 
the Committee’s approach in Young is also observable in this more 
recent case from Colombia. 
Again, two Committee members issued a separate opinion, but 
this time they were flatly dissenting.233 Committee members 
Abdelfattah Amor and Ahmed Tawfik Khalil declared 
simply,  among other statements, that “current enforceable 
international law . . . does not recognize any human right to sexual 
orientation.”234 
All of these cases from the Committee are, of course, 
interpreting the ICCPR, and Article 17(1) of the ICCPR is phrased 
in broad terms to protect “privacy,” while Article 26 is phrased in 
broad terms to prohibit “discrimination.”235 The separate opinions 
issued by some of the Committee members in the last two cases 
illustrates that, in spite of the encouragement of broad 
interpretative approaches suggested by the language, lower as well 
as higher levels of generality can be adopted. The pattern remains 
here that the higher levels of generality have been more suitable 
for the advancement of LGBT rights.236 
F. United Nations Human Rights Council 
We have already seen that in 2011 the HR Council asked the 
OHCHR to issue a report outlining discrimination and acts of 
violence around the world based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.237 
For purposes of this article, it is worth taking a special look at 
the resolution through which this report was requested. This was 
the HR Council Resolution 17/19,238 and it is justly celebrated as 
 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  See id. at 12 annex (Amor & Khalil, dissenting). 
 234.  See id. 
 235.  For example, the first sentence of Article 26 of the ICCPR declares: “All 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law.” ICCPR, supra note 44. 
 236.  See infra Part IV.F.1. 
 237.  As noted in supra note 141 and accompanying text, the report was titled 
Discriminatory Laws and Practices and acts of Violence Against Individuals Based on Their 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. 
 238.  Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, G.A. Res. 17/19, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/19 (July 14, 2011). 
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“the first United Nations resolution on human rights, sexual 
orientation and gender identity.”239 It represents the first time that 
any organ of the U.N. has issued a resolution substantively 
addressing the rights of LGBT people as human rights.240 
A noteworthy aspect of Resolution 17/19 is that it is short and 
relatively terse. It begins with a set of broad but succinct 
observations about “the universality, interdependence, indivisibility 
and interrelatedness of human rights.”241 It continues to speak in 
general terms about “universal respect for the protection of all 
human rights”242 and liberally refers to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and 
the Universal Declaration.243 The resolution then expresses “grave 
concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the 
world, committed against individuals because of their sexual 
orientation and gender identity.”244 Although sexual orientation 
and gender identity are mentioned several times in the resolution, 
such mentions are always in the larger context of human rights in 
general and in proximity to references to currently existing human 
rights instruments and offices.245 
Resolution 17/19 of the HR Council thus reflects a high level 
of generality. This may, in part, stem from its role as a document 
soliciting further work by others.246 But, it is nevertheless worth 
noting the resolution’s positive aspects and results. As noted above, 
it is the first U.N. resolution addressing the rights of LGBT people 
as human rights,247 and two reports by the OHCHR were delivered 
in response to or in light of its terms.248 In this context, the 
generality of its presentational approach is worth noting. 
Resolution 17/19 has since been followed with a new HR 
Council Resolution requesting that the OHCHR update its 2011 
report, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against 
 
 239.  Born Free and Equal, supra note 143, at 9. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, supra note 238, 
pmbl. 
 242.  Id. para. 3. 
 243.  Id. para. 1. 
 244.  Id. para. 4. 
 245.  See id. 
 246.  As noted in supra Part IV.C.1, the HR Council used Resolution 17/19 to 
solicit a report from the OHCHR, and in response, the OHCHR issued its 
November 17, 2011 report, Discriminatory Laws, supra note 141.  
 247.  Born Free and Equal, supra note 143, at 9.  
 248.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.249 
The text of this new resolution, issued in September of 2014, tracks 
the language of Resolution 17/19 almost verbatim, and thus, 
exhibits the same degree of generality as the earlier resolution. 
G. Resolutions of Representative Bodies of Regional Human Rights 
Institutions 
In addition to the U.N.-based human rights instruments and 
bodies, there are three major regional organizations that play 
significant roles in the advancement and protection of human 
rights within their geographic areas. In recent years, representative 
bodies within all three of these organizations have issued 
resolutions designed to advance the cause of LGBT rights. The 
different resolutions have reflected varying degrees of generality. 
1. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
An earlier segment of this article introduced the Council of 
Europe and discussed the activities of its primary judicial organ, the 
ECtHR.250 The reported decisions of the ECtHR are important in 
the field of international human rights and were discussed 
earlier.251 However, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) also meets regularly and, among other functions, 
issues resolutions designed to advance and protect human rights.252 
On April 29, 2010, the PACE adopted its Resolution 1728 titled 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.253 
Resolutions of PACE are nonbinding, but PACE can take a member 
state’s compliance into account when deciding on the accreditation 
 
 249.  See Human Rights Council Res., supra note 142 and accompanying text; 
see also Discriminatory Laws, supra note 141. 
 250.  See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See supra notes 158–93 and accompanying text. 
 252.  The Statute of the Council of Europe (Statute) initially created a 
Consultative Assembly. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 155, art. 
10(ii). Now the Parliamentary Assembly, it is the “deliberative organ of the 
Council of Europe.” Id. art. 22. The Statute provides that it must meet in “ordinary 
session once a year,” and that it can also be convened for “extraordinary sessions.” 
Id. arts. 32, 34. The Statute also provides that it is empowered to issue resolutions, 
upon a two-thirds majority vote. Id. art. 29. 
 253.  Eur. Parl. Ass., Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity, 17th Sess., Doc. No. 1728 (2010). 
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of that state’s delegation to it and can recommend the suspension 
of a member state from the Council of Europe.254 
PACE Resolution 1728 consists of seventeen numbered 
paragraphs, of which the first fifteen are relatively general 
observations about the need for greater protections for LGBT 
persons throughout the states comprising the Council of Europe.255 
For example, paragraph 1 declares that “sexual orientation, which 
covers heterosexuality, bisexuality and homosexuality, is a 
profound part of the identity of . . . every human being,” and that 
“[g]ender identity refers to each person’s deeply felt internal and 
individual experience of gender.”256 Paragraph 2 provides that 
“[u]nder international law, . . . [s]exual orientation and gender 
identity are recognised as prohibited grounds for 
discrimination.”257 
Most of these fifteen initial paragraphs describe various aspects 
of the legal predicaments of LGBT people within the states of the 
Council of Europe.258 Paragraph 5 notes, among other things, 
“Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity can be magnified on the basis of sex and gender, with 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women, in particular, running 
an increased risk of violence.”259 Paragraph 10 observes that “[t]he 
denial of rights to de facto ‘LGBT families’ in many member states 
must also be addressed, including through the legal recognition 
and protection of these families.”260 
All of these fifteen paragraphs can be viewed as being stated 
with a high level of generality since they do not mention the names 
of any states or any particular laws or regulations involved. They 
also do not state any specific recommendations to address the 
situations they are describing.261 
Paragraph 16 of the resolution, however, consists of sixteen 
specifically stated recommendations that PACE is directing to the 
 
 254.  See, e.g., The Powers of the Assembly, PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY COUNCIL EUR., 
http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/apce/powers (last visited Dec. 2, 2014). 
 255.  Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, supra 
note 253. 
 256.  Id. at 1, para. 1. 
 257.  Id. para. 2. 
 258.  Id. at 1–2, paras. 1–15. 
 259.  Id. at 1, para. 5. 
 260.  Id. at 2, para. 10. 
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member states of the Council of Europe.262 For example, paragraph 
16.5 calls on member states to “adopt and implement anti-
discrimination legislation which includes sexual orientation and 
gender identity among the prohibited grounds for discrimination, 
as well as sanctions for infringements;”263 paragraph 16.10 calls on 
member states to “provide the possibility for joint parental 
responsibility of each partner’s children, bearing in mind the 
interests of the children;”264 and paragraph 16.13 calls on member 
states to “promote research on discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity” and engage in similar fact-finding 
and consultation activities.265 
The numerous subparagraphs of paragraph 16 are stated with 
much specificity as to the goals being advanced, and thus, 
incorporate a lower level of generality than the first fifteen 
paragraphs.266 
2. General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
The Organization of American States (OAS) was established in 
1948, through its Charter of that year.267 According to the OAS 
Charter, it has a broad range of purposes, including “[t]o 
strengthen the peace and security of the continent; [t]o promote 
and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the 
principle of nonintervention; [t]o prevent possible causes of 
difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes . . . ;”268 
and to achieve similar goals. The OAS Charter establishes an OAS 
General Assembly as “the supreme organ” of the OAS.269 The OAS 
Charter requires that the OAS General Assembly “shall convene 
annually . . . at a place selected in accordance with the principle of 
rotation.”270 
 
 262.  Id. at 2–3, para. 16. 
 263.  Id. at 3, para. 16.5. 
 264.  Id. para. 16.10. 
 265.  Id. para. 16.13. 
 266.  The last paragraph of the resolution, paragraph 17, allows for the 
possibility of exemptions for some religious institutions and organizations. Id. at 4, 
para. 17.  
 267.  Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 21 
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 268.  Id. art. 2. 
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On June 4, 2014, the OAS General Assembly adopted a 
resolution titled Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity 
and Expression.271 In substance, the resolution consists of ten 
numbered paragraphs, each of which states a position of the OAS 
General Assembly regarding the treatment of LGBT persons within 
the member states of the OAS.272 For example, in paragraph 2, the 
OAS General Assembly resolves to “encourage member states to 
consider, within the parameters of the legal institutions of their 
domestic systems, adopting public policies against discrimination 
by reason of sexual orientation and gender identity or 
expression.”273 Paragraph 4 urges member states “to produce data 
on homophobic and transphobic violence, with a view to fostering 
public policies that protect the human rights of LGBT persons.”274 
These ten paragraphs are much more in line with the more 
generally phrased initial fifteen paragraphs of the PACE resolution 
than the specific recommendations in the lengthy paragraph 16. 
The OAS resolution’s paragraphs are phrased in terms more 
mindful of the individual political will of its member states—using 
more deferential language than that generally found in the PACE 
resolution. Being less specific about the distinct actions it is urging 
on the member states, the resolution is formulated in broad terms 
at a relatively high level of generality. 
3. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
In 2001, the African Union assumed the mantle of the former 
Organization of African Unity, established in 1963.275 Under the 
auspices of the predecessor organization, the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted in 1981.276 This 1981 
Charter established the African Commission on Human and 
 
 271.  Organization of American States [OAS], Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, 
and Gender Identity and Expression, AG/RES/2863 (XLIV-O/14) (June 5, 2014), 
available at http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/Resoluciones 
-Declaraciones.asp (follow “Forty-Fourth regular session” hyperlink; go to page 
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 274.  Id. 
 275.  HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1063 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 276.  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature June 
27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
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Peoples’ Rights (African Commission).277 It provides that the 
African Commission consist “of eleven members chosen from 
amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known for 
their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in 
matters of human and peoples’ rights.”278 The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights indicates that the purpose of the 
African Commission is “to promote human and peoples’ rights and 
ensure their protection in Africa.”279 
In May 2014 the African Commission adopted a resolution 
titled Resolution on Protection Against Violence and Other Human Rights 
Violations Against Persons on the Basis of Their Real or Imputed Sexual 
Orientation or Gender Identity.280 By comparison with the PACE and 
OAS resolutions, the African Commission’s resolution is quite 
short, consisting of only four operative (numbered) paragraphs 
following seven preamble paragraphs.281 The first operative 
paragraph condemns “violence and other human rights violations” 
on the basis of the “imputed or real sexual orientation or gender 
identity” of those affected.282 The other three are of a similar 
character, all of them addressed to one extent or another to the 
prevention of violence and criminal abuse directed against people 
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.283 
It seems worthwhile to compare these three regional 
resolutions—those of the PACE in Europe,284 the OAS in the 
Americas,285 and the African Commission in Africa. Of these three, 
the African Commission’s Resolution is the least ambitious and 
covers the smallest number of potential circumstances in which the 
rights of LGBT people could be at risk.286 It is thus far less 
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particular in its application than either of the other two and, being 
less specific in many circumstances, is adopting a broader level of 
generality. 
H. American Bar Association Resolution of August 11, 2014 
The ABA, founded in 1878, with nearly 400,000 members, is 
one of the world’s largest voluntary professional organizations.287 Its 
activities are not restricted to the United States.288 The ABA states 
that it promotes “the international rule of law through programs in 
more than forty countries that focus on access to justice, human 
rights, anti-corruption, judicial reform and more.”289 The policy-
making body of the ABA is its House of Delegates, which meets 
twice annually.290 
On August 11, 2014, the House of Delegates adopted a 
resolution addressing the rights of LGBT persons throughout the 
world.291 In four succinct but powerful points, the ABA recognized 
that LGBT people have a right to be free from discrimination, 
threats, and violence; urged governments to repeal discriminatory 
laws and practices against them; urged other bar associations and 
attorneys in jurisdictions around the world to work to defend the 
victims of anti-LGBT discrimination or conduct; and urged the U.S. 
government to work to end discrimination against LGBT people 
and ensure their rights.292 
The four paragraphs of the ABA resolution cover, in general 
terms, the many types of discrimination and abuse that LGBT 
people can encounter throughout the world.293 It avoids, however, 
 
regional resolutions also address, for example, issues of discrimination and 
decriminalization of homosexuality.  
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the very specific catalogs of recommendations found, for example, 
in the PACE resolution and the Yogyakarta Principles.294 The ABA 
resolution was formulated at a high level of generality rather than a 
low one. 
V. AN ASSESSMENT OF HIGH GENERALITY FOR THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 
This article suggests that in the circumstances of the General 
Assembly, activists should work toward an initial resolution that 
adopts a high level of generality rather than a low level of 
generality. Several points regarding this suggestion are in order. 
A. Contrast with Patterns of Some Earlier General Assembly Resolutions 
Certain earlier General Assembly resolutions regarding human 
rights have reached nearly iconic status. Indeed, some treatise 
authors have determined that some General Assembly resolutions 
have become so celebrated and respected that they provide the 
basis for rules of customary international law. 
Prominent examples of such resolutions are the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples295 and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.296 Other famous General Assembly resolutions that have 
had substantial impact on the field of human rights include the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations,297 the Declaration on 
 
 294.  Compare id., with supra Parts IV.B, G.1. 
 295.  G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960); see, e.g., 
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (8th ed. 
2012) (suggesting that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples provides “a basis for . . . the speedy consolidation 
of customary rules”); SHAW, supra note 25, at 115–16 (stating that the declaration 
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of resolutions in general and specific terms attacking colonialism and . . . it would 
seem, [transmuted a] moral principle to a legal right and consequent 
obligation”). 
 296.  G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); see, e.g., 
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Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,298 and the 
Declaration on the Definition of Aggression.299 
All of these resolutions were formulated with careful attention 
to specific recommendations. It was part of their apparent aim to 
be as thorough as possible in addressing the international ills 
involved in each case. Accordingly, an initial General Assembly 
resolution advancing and protecting LGBT rights at a high level of 
generality would not follow the same pattern as many of the most 
prominent historical General Assembly human rights resolutions. 
This is not to assert that an LGBT resolution would be less 
important than any of its predecessors, but rather, to note that its 
formulation and drafting will need to follow a path distinct from 
many earlier resolutions. 
B. Record of Success in the European Court of Human Rights, Before the 
Human Rights Committee, and with the United Nations Human 
Rights Council 
Among the international authorities and precedents reviewed 
in Part IV of this article, the more successful of those have adopted 
higher levels of generality. The Dudgeon opinion of the ECtHR was 
cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in 
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.300 The Toonen decision of the ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee has been received with approval by 
commentators.301 Resolution 17/19 issued by the Committee was 
notable for having attained agreement from states in virtually all 
regions of the world, no doubt in part due to its highly general style 
of formulation.302 
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Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981)). 
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103, 105 (2001) (noting with approval that “the history of the Toonen decision and 
its consequences shows the growing impact in many parts of the world of the 
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 302.  Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, supra note 238. 
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By contrast, among the more specifically drafted authorities 
and precedents covered in Part III, success appears to have been 
less conspicuous. The Yogyakarta Principles and the 
recommendations of the PACE resolution from 2010 were notable 
for the detail and specificity of their scope. Yet, in the context of 
their continued presence in the discourse of LGBT rights, adverse 
developments of recent years have nevertheless occurred.303 
Without presenting a perfect contrast, this pattern is 
sufficiently robust to suggest that the high level of generality rather 
than a lower, specific level, would be most appropriate for the first 
U.N. General Assembly resolution addressing LGBT rights. 
C. Record of Success in U.S. Courts 
Also worth noting is the success of higher levels of generality 
regarding LGBT rights before the United States Supreme Court. As 
noted earlier, the initial anti-LGBT ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick 
defined LGBT interests at a specific level of generality.304 It was 
then overturned by Lawrence v. Texas, which adopted a high level of 
generality.305 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in United 
States v. Windsor, favorable from an LGBT-rights perspective, could 
also be viewed as adopting a broad level of generality.306 The 
Court’s partial reliance on the doctrine of federalism, combined 
with its extolling of marriage as an aspect of family rather than as a 
site of specifically sexual relations, allows for this characterization. 
D. Lack of Success of 2008 Attempt in the General Assembly 
In the closing days of 2008, advocates operating at the General 
Assembly attempted to gain that body’s approval for a resolution 
that would have advanced and attempted to protect the cause of 
LGBT rights.307 On December 18 of that year, as part of the General 
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Assembly’s plenary deliberations, the representative of Argentina, 
backed by those of several other countries, suggested the adoption 
of a resolution advancing protections for LGBT people.308 
Representatives from Syria, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and 
the Holy See, however, spoke against the suggested resolution.309 
The suggested resolution did not even come up for a vote.310 
The attempted resolution consisted of thirteen short 
numbered paragraphs that were of only moderately specific 
generality.311 For example, paragraph 11 called upon all states “to 
take all the necessary measures, in particular legislative or 
administrative, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity 
may under no circumstances be the basis for criminal penalties, in 
particular executions, arrests or detention.”312 
The difficulty encountered by this attempted resolution, in 
light of the international precedents and authorities reviewed 
above, is instructive. If a resolution of only moderate specificity was 
so unsuccessful, a resolution of an even higher level of generality is 
well-advised for the next effort before the General Assembly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Many advocates and activists for LGBT rights around the world 
have tried to be as thorough and specific as possible when 
advancing their aims in formulating principles and 
recommendations for action. This is, in many respects, laudable. 
However, attention should be given to the most appropriate 
strategy for obtaining the first U.N. General Assembly resolution 
advancing and protecting LGBT rights. This article has reviewed 
relevant and influential international precedents and authorities 
from the standpoint of the relative degrees of generality with which 
they were formulated. It appears from this review that a strategy 
incorporating a very high level of generality is available. It is 
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suggested that this strategy will be most appropriate in the effort 
before the General Assembly. 
